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Abstract
This article presents original research on relations between middle-class residents 
and informal-sector workers in Delhi, India. It shows how middle-class associations 
used their consumption preferences as well as relationships with local authorities to 
legitimize the work of street hawkers and waste workers. These findings suggest that 
the toleration of informality can be traced to governance regimes comprised of both 
state and non-state powerbrokers.
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Introduction
Initial research on informality viewed it as economic practice beyond the reach of the 
state, connected to the income generation activities of ‘the urban sub-proletariat seek[ing] 
informal means of increasing their incomes’ (Hart, 1973: 67). Subsequent scholarship 
broadened the concept to include unregulated land-use (e.g. informal settlements) and 
service systems (e.g. water and waste management). More recent work acknowledges the 
role played by the state in enabling informality. Paradoxically, then, while some scholars 
identify activities and spaces as informal if they are beyond the reach of the state, others 
argue that the state actively produces informality. In both of these formulations the state 
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remains a key reference point. This article suggests that a focus on the state can hinder our 
understanding of informality, and it makes this claim with a focus on the role played by 
middle-class associations in regulating informal-sector street hawkers and waste collec-
tors in Delhi, India.
In many affluent neighbourhoods in Delhi, door-to-door delivery of basic foodstuffs 
and the collection of waste has become so routinized that the rigid distinction between 
formal/informal commerce has broken down. While middle-class associations cannot 
lawfully charge street hawkers or wastepickers a fee to operate, such practices are wide-
spread and institutionalized, and as such they serve to sanction hawkers’ and wastepick-
ers’ use of space while also shielding them from formal regulations and low-level 
municipal officials. Given these citizen-led practices, it is misleading to privilege the 
state as the primary reference point for identifying and understanding informality. 
Instead, an understanding of informality should be broadened to account for the ways in 
which middle classes and other influential non-state actors also sanction the informal use 
of space and services.
Middle classes rarely appear in accounts of informality, largely because of the schol-
arly preference for studying producers rather than consumers of informal services. This 
bias may be a product of the longstanding concern with defining who or what exactly 
should be considered informal. Such debates involved more than proposing typologies 
(Hart, 1973). A number of international organizations set about devising ways to meas-
ure informality, and by the 1980s the International Labour Organization had established 
itself as the primary source of standardized country-level data on the informal economy 
(Elyachar, 2003). Despite the work of statisticians to render the informal visible, meas-
urable and comparable, their efforts failed to provide policy makers or scholars with 
useful categories for differentiating the formal and the informal. Portes (1983: 156) 
anticipated the limitations of prevailing formulations of informality, noting that the 
classification of people/activities as informal was imprecise because it included ‘entre-
preneurs and their workers, self-employed artisans and merchants, disguised wage 
laborers subcontracted by formal firms, and direct subsistence workers’. He further 
argued (Portes, 1983: 156) that that by looking for a rigid dividing line between the 
formal and informal, scholars failed to understand that informal practices were part and 
parcel of a single economic system.
An impetus for both the definitional and conceptual rethinking of informality came 
from the neoliberal economist Hernando de Soto’s (1989) efforts to expand the concept 
to include land-use. With a focus on the ways in which land is occupied and evolves into 
informal settlements in cities of the developing world, he found informality is a potential 
source of growth rather than a barrier. But in order to unleash its pent-up energy, he also 
argued that regulations must be rolled back and bureaucracies weakened. Thus, infor-
mality went from being a narrowly-defined set of economic activities that hindered 
growth, to a broad set of practices surrounding economic activity and land-use with the 
potential to foster economic growth.
Scholars struggling with theory developed in the Global North to understand urbani-
zation in the Global South further broadened the scholarly conceptualization of informal-
ity. In their landmark volume, AlSayyad and Roy (2004: 1) diverge from De Soto’s view 
of the state, and demonstrated that governments actively facilitated activities and land-
use hitherto considered informal. Roy (2009: 82) went so far as to identify informality as 
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an ‘idiom’ of urbanization in India, in the sense that ‘legal norms and forms of regulation 
are in and of themselves permeated by the logic of informality’.
This insight complements research on urbanization in India that demonstrates how the 
state, operating through a mixture of formal and informal channels, imposes formal land-
use regulations selectively (Björkman, 2014; Ghertner, 2010; Johnston, 2014). More 
recently, the sectoral domains in which informality operates have been broadened further 
to include service provision. Incomplete urban infrastructure systems are a lasting legacy 
of colonialism (Gandy, 2004; McFarlane and Rutherford, 2008), and scholarship has 
shown that in response, informal networks facilitate the supply of water in many cities 
(see De Alba, this issue; Gopakumar, 2014; Graham et al., 2013). Similarly, formal waste 
management systems are complemented by vast informal systems in many cities, with 
the two interlinked and difficult to disentangle (Schindler and Kishore, 2015). All in all, 
urban informality is now broadly defined and includes economic activity, land-use and 
service provision – in which these spheres oftentimes overlap in a plethora of 
configurations.
In the remainder of this article, I draw on my own fieldwork to suggest that when it 
comes to service provision, the state is only one actor among many that seeks to govern 
cities. Stated differently, localized governance regimes are as likely to be constructed and 
imposed by non-state actors as the state. In particular, I argue that middle-class associa-
tions play an important role sanctioning informal economic activity, regulating space, 
and managing localized service provision. The data come from 10 months of fieldwork 
in 2011 and follow-up visits in 2012 and 2013 in Delhi, India. During my visits I 
researched street hawking and volunteered with an NGO whose activities support 
wastepickers in various ways. Both groups are considered a threat to public order; yet in 
both instances, members of the middle class are eager to take advantage of the cheap 
services they offer. Thus, middle-class associations sought to render street hawkers and 
waste collectors non-threatening by reworking and regulating urban space in ways that 
structure the terms of their interactions. In fact, the regimes imposed by these middle-
class associations became institutionalized to such an extent that it makes little sense to 
refer to them as ‘informal’, even as their actions vis-a-vis informal service providers also 
challenged the latter’s own informal status.
Informality and urban India’s dynamic social structure
Informality in urban India is a constantly moving constellation of activities whose rela-
tionship with public-sector bureaucracies and private-sector enterprises can shift over 
time and in space. In many cases an activity’s designation as ‘informal’ simply indicates 
an absence of a state-issued licence. For example, unlicensed street hawkers may be 
subjected to raids by municipal authorities, but their activities can suddenly be formal-
ized with a favourable court ruling. The boundary between formal/informal is contested 
by a range of interest groups, such that the definition of informality is ever-shifting and 
what is deemed informal today may be formal tomorrow or vice versa (Björkman, 2014; 
Schindler, 2014a). There is nothing inherently ‘informal’ about a particular economic 
activity, but rather, the boundary between formal and informality is blurry, fluid and 
determined by a corpus of regulations, court rulings, enforcement practices, and efforts 
to skirt regulations.
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While the boundary between formal and informal is blurry, most street hawkers and 
waste collectors operate squarely in the latter. Even so, many are able to operate, and 
hence earn a livelihood, precisely because of their relationship with middle-class asso-
ciations. In the context of urban India the term ‘middle class’ is contested (see Lemanski 
and Lama-Rewal, 2013), but there is a general consensus that a new class has emerged 
– or at least grown considerably – whose newness ‘refers to a process of production of 
a distinctive social and political identity that represents and lays claim to the benefits to 
liberalization’ (Fernandes, 2006: xviii). This class is highly visible: its members live in 
exclusive gated communities that are remaking skylines, their expensive imported 
automobiles are ubiquitous in snarled traffic, and they conspicuously consume in high-
profile shopping centres. In addition, India’s new middle class1 is increasingly politi-
cally assertive in its attempt to influence the transformation of the city, while it is also 
dependent on cheap services provided informally (e.g. drivers, nannies, waste collectors, 
domestic servants, street hawkers, gardeners, security guards, clothes washers, parking 
attendants and so on). Associations representing the new middle class regulate activity 
and urban space in ways that allow their members to benefit from the availability of 
cheap, informal-sector services such as street hawking and waste collecting, but cir-
cumscribe informal-sector workers’ use of space.
Wastepickers
Delhi residents are legally obliged to deposit waste in neighbourhood depots, where its 
removal becomes the responsibility of municipal authorities who are increasingly reliant 
on private-sector waste management enterprises (Municipal Corporation of Delhi Act, 
1957). In reality, Delhi’s public-sector solid waste management services have a spotty 
track record, so there are between 150,000 and 200,000 informal-sector waste workers in 
Delhi – hereafter ‘wastepickers’ – whose labour has historically augmented municipal 
efforts to manage waste (Chaturvedi and Gidwani, 2011).2 Wastepickers collect recycla-
ble material throughout Delhi and sell it to formal and informal recyclers. Most work 
independently or in teams and have standing agreements with buyers of recyclable mate-
rials, while some are contracted by middlemen. The most comprehensive study of Delhi’s 
informal waste sector showed that it exhibits a rigid division of labour, with individuals 
specializing in particular materials or activities such as segregating, collecting or pro-
cessing (Gill, 2010). According to Gill (2010: 99), wastepickers throughout the industry 
‘face regular interference from police and security guards in residential colonies’. Not 
only is this interference a result of rent-seeking by those powerful enough to determine 
how and by whom urban space is used, but as demonstrated below, it is also a result of 
middle-class associations seeking to impose order within their environs.
Given the inability of the public waste management system to collect and process 
Delhi’s waste, middle-class residents are dependent on the services offered by wastepick-
ers. In one focus group discussion with representatives of market traders in an affluent 
satellite city on Delhi’s outskirts, there was unanimity that public officials were unable 
to manage the city’s waste, but disagreement over whether the state was unaccountable 
or incompetent: ‘The government people, you tell them that there’s a problem with the 
garbage collection. They will buy the best of the trucks, but just after one or two years 
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you will find that [the trucks] are broken.’ Another participant agreed that municipal 
efforts to manage waste were inadequate, but insisted that part of the problem was that 
‘citizens’ were not ‘sensitive’ and tended to dispose of their waste haphazardly. I inter-
vened and asked if waste was disposed of haphazardly by local residents, and municipal 
authorities failed to collect it, how was it collected at all? One participant explained that 
‘somehow or other waste is collected’, and the conversation shifted to the complex 
arrangements that the participants developed with informal-sector waste collectors in the 
market and their neighbourhoods.
These arrangements varied from place to place, but there were two underlying 
principles in all the agreements. First, the composition and volume of waste deter-
mined whether wastepickers paid or were paid to collect waste. One participant 
explained that ‘in most of the Western world the segregation of garbage is done on 
the basis of degradable and bio-degradable. Here there’s only one factor, valuable 
and non-valuable’. Wastepickers pay to collect waste composed of a large amount of 
recyclable material (e.g. plastic, metal and paper), while they are paid to collect 
waste that is primarily organic or inert (i.e. non-recyclable). The market generated a 
significant amount of recyclable waste, much sought after by wastepickers, but par-
ticipants in the focus group explained that there was a constant struggle to ensure 
that wastepickers also collected organic waste. Second, all of the agreements between 
middle-class residents and traders only covered waste collection and removal; none 
of them addressed disposal. Once waste was collected, wastepickers segregated the 
recyclable from non-recyclable material, but they had little incentive to dispose of it 
at the dumping grounds designated by municipal authorities because attendants there 
charged a fee. Middle-class residents and wastepickers were in agreement that this 
system made little sense – the former was incensed by haphazard disposal of waste 
throughout the city, while the latter complained of constant pressure from low-level 
officials to pay bribes.
Unlike older residential communities in Delhi, the neighbouring residential commu-
nity lacked a depot for residents to deposit their waste. As a result, it had to be collected 
from residents’ doorsteps; and in the absence of an effective public waste management 
system residents were left with little choice but to contract wastepickers. This was 
arranged collectively, and since a significant portion of the waste was non-recyclable, 
each household above the ground floor paid Rs 100–200 per month. Security was a pri-
mary concern among residents, and while the community was originally not gated the 
resident welfare association had erected metal gates to the consternation of residents 
from the neighbouring community because it limited their access to a main thoroughfare. 
Wastepickers were provided with identification, which was inspected by security guards 
stationed at the entrances of the community. While wastepickers provided the only waste 
removal services in the community, they were also subject to suspicion as the conversa-
tion below demonstrates:
Respondent 1:  Many of these ragpickers who collect this garbage early in the 
morning, they are more interested in finding some opportunity 
where they can pick up something from inside the house. It is a kind 
of disguise.
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Respondent 2:  I have never noticed this. I have never seen this as a problem.
Respondent 1:  I have experienced this, in my home also there was a burglary some 
years back. When I talked with the police guy he said ‘you know 
these rag pickers, they come at such an early hour, it’s very difficult 
to do policing at that hour’, and you know what they do, they just 
go inside the houses, pick up things. If you detain them, you see, 
they know all their human rights, have the agencies which will 
come to the police station [to help them].
Interviewer: NGOs?
Respondent 1:  These are the kind of NGOs that are misused. They have the spe-
cific function of shielding these people.
Residents developed a licensing system in an effort to reconcile their goals of maintain-
ing security and ensuring waste removal. The wastepickers who worked in this colony 
expressed satisfaction with the arrangement because it guaranteed monthly income. 
Furthermore, it ensured that they did not face competition from other wastepickers. The 
use of security guards was highly effective at prohibiting entry of anyone who was an 
unlicensed non-resident. One security guard beamed with pride as he explained that there 
had not been a single complaint regarding security in five years. The licensing system is 
not limited to wastepickers but includes other informal service sector workers. For exam-
ple, in the centre of the community is a small field in which a tailor sits most days with 
a pedal-operated sewing machine. Thus, the residents of this community managed to 
modify the built environment (i.e. erect gates) and impose a localized regulatory regime 
that determined who could enter and circulate through their community. The limits to 
their control were evident: the land directly behind the community had become an infor-
mal landfill where wastepickers disposed of non-recyclable waste. The inability of resi-
dents to control this land highlighted both the fragility of their control over urban space 
as well as the patchwork nature of space in Delhi.
In conclusion, the absence of effective formal solid waste management services moti-
vated middle-class Delhi residents to interact with wastepickers. Arrangements became 
unique and localized, with their exact terms determined by the composition of waste (i.e. 
the proportion of recyclable material). As such, the local community was forced to pay 
wastepickers to collect their waste because it was primarily organic. Residents sought to 
impose rules that would ensure their waste was removed while maintaining control over 
who circulated within their environs. Residents were able to enforce a licensing regime 
because they had erected gates and stationed security guards at the entrances to their 
community. Meanwhile, limits to their control of urban space were evidenced by the 
emergence of an informal dumping ground behind the community. The juxtaposition of 
an affluent neighbourhood bordering a de facto landfill is an example of splintering 
urban space par excellence, produced as a result of the arrangements forged between 
wastepickers and residents.
Street hawkers
Retail in India is largely informal, and in Delhi approximately 500,000 street hawkers sell 
a range of goods from food to household goods and decorative items (Joseph et al., 2008; 
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SEWA, 2012). The vast majority of street hawkers are unlicensed and hence they run the 
risk of having their goods confiscated in raids conducted by municipal officials. The crim-
inalization of street hawkers is heightened in certain areas where authorities hope to show-
case a ‘clean and green’, ‘world-class’ vision of urban transformation (Dupont, 2011; 
Truelove and Mawdsley, 2011). Periodic raids conducted by municipal authorities are the 
primary threat to street hawkers, and in order to limit risk and gain access to urban space 
they must navigate physical barriers and a plethora of overlapping governance regimes 
established by non-state actors. Unlike municipal officials who steadfastly resist legally 
sanctioning of street hawkers’ use of urban space, associations that represent the middle 
class facilitate street hawkers’ access to urban space in exchange for their adherence to a 
strict code of conduct regarding their demeanour and appearance, when they can operate, 
how much they can charge for their products and so on (Schindler, 2014b).
In one bustling market in a rather affluent area of south Delhi, large crowds are drawn 
by the range of products offered – from cheap imitations of branded goods to luxury 
wedding garments. Street food stalls dish out local favourites just steps away from a 
KFC outlet. The traders association seeks to maintain the character of the market, which 
means allowing a certain number of street hawkers to operate. The president of the mar-
ket’s largest traders association explained that ‘from our level [the] market should be 
neat and clean, shop person should be neat and clean. Let the customers come inside 
…You’ll get all items here, you’ll get fruits, all items you’re getting, even textiles, jewel-
lery, medicine. Your hawkers are there, rich people, all are there.’ Thus, the traders asso-
ciation considers hawkers an integral part of the market, and it seeks to regulate their 
activity and number. The president of the association explained that ‘we are a little bit 
strict with the hawkers. Whenever I move on the road, most of the hawkers are hiding. 
Moreover we have some security guard outside, instructing them not to harass any cus-
tomers.’ While hawkers are subjected to the regulations imposed by the market traders 
and enforced by private security guards on an everyday basis, they must be wary of 
municipal authorities who carry out periodic raids, typically once per week, in search of 
unlicensed hawkers. During these raids the vast majority escape to nearby alleyways and 
parks, only to return after the departure of authorities. These raids inevitably disrupt 
commerce, which partly explains why the market traders association opposes them. 
Their president stated that ‘it affects our business whenever the MCD [Municipal 
Corporation of Delhi] or different people come [to raid the market] … moreover, the 
customers get harassed … “What happened here? Why did it happen?” … When [a raid] 
is there in the market customers get panicked.’ Furthermore, the raids serve as a chal-
lenge to the market traders’ authority to regulate the market. This was illustrated by the 
opposition of the president of the traders association to a municipal scheme that involved 
licensing a number of hawkers:
MCD has planned to build small stalls inside here, the market, under the direction of the 
Supreme Court. But we are not allowing them … Supreme Court said 2.5% of the population 
[are hawkers] … They want to build up kiosks around the park [in the centre of the market]. But 
we are opposing that.
The hawkers who work in this market are somewhat cynical about the payments they 
have to make to middlemen in order to operate. When pressed about who she pays, one 
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female hawker just shrugged and said ‘everybody takes [money]’. The fee for operating 
in the market varies according to a range of factors, such as a hawker’s age, gender and 
what they sell. While most hawkers considered the fee rather high, they were not opposed 
to the system in principle because it provided a secure livelihood. One hawker explained 
that if there were no restrictions ‘everyone who is unemployed would become a vendor’. 
Echoing the president of the market traders association, hawkers valued the heavy foot 
traffic within the market. One hawker who sold socks and had previously worked at 
another market explained that as a result of the limited number of hawkers who operate 
in the market he is able work fewer hours: ‘Over here I come at 2, I work until 9. But in 
the previous location I would have had to work from early morning [to earn the same 
amount of money].’ Another hawker explained:
In the shopping mall they sell [these products] for more. That does not make a difference to me, 
there are so many people in this world, they don’t all go to the same place. Some feel products 
here are nice, some feel products there are nice … People who come here are not just the people 
with money, there are different kinds of people coming here.
This hawker directed his ire at municipal authorities, a sentiment that was nearly univer-
sal among hawkers within the market.
A similar arrangement obtained in a nearby neighbourhood, in which hawkers paid a 
fee to a resident welfare association (RWA) for permission to sell door-to-door. In this 
case, however, there were far fewer hawkers and they were required by the RWA to 
undergo a thorough licensing procedure (licences listed identifiable marks on hawkers’ 
bodies). Hawkers who had operated in the neighbourhood for years prior to the imple-
mentation of the licensing system were favoured; and in comparison to the market, the 
fee was trivial because the primary concern of residents was to regulate those who 
entered their neighbourhood. A candidate contesting an election for the RWA explained 
that ‘the hawker menace’ was ever-present, and this explained the RWA’s regulation of 
the practice. Since the licence was not issued lawfully it could be revoked by the RWA at 
any time. Thus, hawkers were forced to maintain a peaceful disposition, because, as one 
hawker explained: ‘Pass is meaningless if somebody complains. If they make one call in 
a minute you have to move.’ Nevertheless, the hawkers were satisfied with these terms 
because the system limited competition from unlicensed hawkers and municipal authori-
ties did not patrol the neighbourhood.
Although there was near universal agreement among residents that hawkers provided 
a valuable service and that hawking should be regulated, disagreement ensued over 
various aspects of the regulatory regime, often impacting association politics. One can-
didate for the RWA election explained that only residents on one side of the neighbour-
hood had invested in security, and unlicensed hawkers were able to enter the other side. 
This created tension among residents because those who had invested in security felt 
others were free-riding and that the neighbourhood remained unsafe. These conflicts 
translated into political disagreement which influenced the RWA and how it chose to 
regulate the neighbourhood. For example, one citizen candidate faced opposition to an 
idea of constructing a toilet for informal service sector workers within the colony, forc-
ing her to acknowledge that it could result in other problems for the RWA: ‘Where to 
build it? Who will maintain it? Then people go there and start doing some [bad] things.’ 
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And while residents and hawkers were satisfied with the licensing system in principle, 
other hawkers took advantage of the absence of security in half of the neighbourhood to 
operate without approval from the RWA. One unlicensed hawker claimed that because 
he sold household products (e.g. soap) he did not have regular customers who pur-
chased from him daily like some of the hawkers who sold fruit. He thus had to operate 
in numerous neighbourhoods, all of which had similar licensing schemes, thus forcing 
him to purchase multiple licences.
In both the market and the neighbourhood there were hawkers who sought to oper-
ate on the margins. In the market, the police had erected metal detectors and metal 
gates at some of the entrances. While the metal detectors where perpetually out of 
order, they served to mark the boundary of the market for the hawkers. Beyond the 
gates hawkers did not pay to operate, yet by operating in the shadow of the market they 
avoided detection by municipal authorities. Most likely they also came to know of 
impending raids. One hawker who sold bangles outside the gates of the market claimed 
that he used to work in another south Delhi market but had the good fortune of obtain-
ing a licence to operate because of a disability. However, he claimed that his licence 
was not recognized by the middleman who collected fees for operating within that 
market; and when he complained to police, they demanded bribes to help him assert his 
lawful right to operate.
If these assertions are true, then they demonstrate that it can be easier and cheaper 
for hawkers to operate in the shadows than to operate legally. A similar phenomenon 
was evident just outside the gates of the neighbourhood. Hawkers operating there were 
less exposed to authorities than they would be on a main road, even as they were not 
forced to obtain a licence from the RWA. According to one fruit vendor whose stall sat 
outside the gates of the neighbourhood, there was little reason to pay for the privilege 
of selling door-to-door: ‘What’s there to a licence? I’ll earn whether I’m inside or out-
side.’ Another hawker received orders by phone for milk and other perishable goods 
from residents, employing a boy to deliver them. This was only possible because he 
had established a rapport with many of the residents over a period of years. In these 
examples, hawkers operated without sanction from authorities or a local powerbroker, 
thus reducing their operating costs. But it remains unclear if, in the long term, they are 
at a disadvantage in comparison to their peers working in the market and gated 
neighbourhood.
Conclusion
I have shown that resident associations representing middle classes play an important 
role in determining provision of regulated and unregulated services in Delhi. Localized 
regimes comprised of middle-class associations, regulatory authorities and service pro-
viders confer legitimacy on the work of street hawkers and waste workers and on their 
capacity to use urban space and provide services. These cases not only introduce a degree 
of ‘formalization’ in the treatment of informal providers by middle-class associations, 
they also expose a fragility in the control exercised by such resident associations, who 
can be superseded by municipal authorities and challenged by workers. The existence of 
such practices renders the city into a dynamic institutional kaleidoscope of overlapping 
jurisdictions. Rather than essentializing particular activities (i.e. street hawking) as 
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‘formal’ or ‘informal’, these activities should be understood as the product of complex 
relationships. In the cases presented here, negotiated relations between formally regis-
tered non-state institutions (i.e. resident welfare associations and market traders associa-
tions), on the one hand, and street hawkers and waste collectors, on the other, determined 
the patterns of ‘informal’ activity, land-use and service provision. These relations are 
contested and can change rapidly.
These findings suggest that rather than a priori classifying which people or institu-
tions, activities or land-use are labelled ‘(in)formal’, a relational approach provides a 
deeper understanding of actually existing practices that define everyday life of urban 
residents, and which are produced collectively by multiple actors. Likewise, these find-
ings demonstrate that the state is simply one of a number of actors struggling to regulate 
activity, land-use and service provision in Indian cities. Although state actors may seek 
to impose order through formal, legal channels, they are often joined by or pitted against 
organized non-state actors, like middle-class associations, who also have a position on 
informality. As such, we must be prepared to analyse and theorize local ‘governance 
regimes’ comprised of state and non-state actors, whose combined priorities will sanc-
tion and institutionalize economic activity, land-use and service provision and its atten-
dant status as formal or informal.
To be sure, further research focused on the co-production and enforcement of such 
regimes would certainly show that street hawkers and waste collectors are vulnerable to 
exploitation by state- and non-state actors alike. A focus on relations and regimes 
imposed by powerbrokers would also leave room for a revamped conceptualization of 
informality as defined in the context of local negotiations over the rules of space occupa-
tion and service provision, rather than as attributable to a certain activity. For example, 
street hawkers who operate just outside the gates of markets and gated communities exist 
in limbo: beyond the reach of middle-class associations but close enough that they are 
not ‘at large’ and thereby avoid scrutiny from officials. Similarly, waste collectors act 
informally when they surreptitiously dump non-recyclable waste adjacent to affluent 
communities to the consternation of residents and officials alike. All this suggests that 
future research should focus on instances in which particular actors (e.g. state officials or 
non-state associations) are more or less successful at imposing their will, with what 
potential challenges, and by whom. Is the state more likely to foster unregulated service 
provision (e.g. waste collection) than economic activity (street hawking), and why? Are 
officials wilfully ceding regulatory control to non-state actors in certain places (e.g. the 
urban periphery or within gated communities), and where? These questions will loom 
large in future research on informality, even as they help reveal the wide range of actors 
who seek to regulate or legitimize informality in land-use and service provision in urban 
India and perhaps even elsewhere.
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Notes
1. While acknowledging the complexity of the debate surrounding the ‘new’ middle class, I 
hereafter use the term ‘middle class’.
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2. A recent op-ed in the New York Times (Karnad, 2015) put the figure at 350,000, although it 
did not cite any sources.
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Résumé
Cet article présente une recherche inédite sur les relations entre des habitants de la 
classe moyenne et des travailleurs du secteur informel à New Delhi en Inde. Il montre 
comment les associations de résidents de la classe moyenne utilisent leurs relations 
avec les autorités locales pour légitimer les activités de camelots et de récupérateurs 
de déchets à qui elles accordent leurs préférences. Les résultats de cette recherche 
suggèrent que la tolérance de l’informalité trouve son origine dans des régimes de 
gouvernance instaurés par l’État et des acteurs non étatiques influents.
Mots-clés
économie informelle, Inde, classe moyenne, Sud, gouvernance urbaine
Resumen
En este artículo se presenta una investigación original sobre las relaciones entre los 
residentes de clase media y los trabajadores informales en Delhi, India. Se muestra 
cómo las asociaciones de clase media utilizan sus preferencias de consumo, así como 
las relaciones con las autoridades locales para legitimar el trabajo de los vendedores 
ambulantes y trabajadores de desecho. Estos hallazgos sugieren que la tolerancia de la 
informalidad remonta a los regímenes de gobierno compuesta tanto por agentes del 
poder estatales y no estatales.
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economía informal, India, clase media, Sur global, gestión urbana
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